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Abstract. When aggregating preferences of agents via voting, two de-
sirable goals are to incentivize agents to participate in the voting process
and then identify outcomes that are Pareto efficient. We consider par-
ticipation as formalized by Brandl, Brandt, and Hofbauer (2015) based
on the stochastic dominance (SD) relation. We formulate a new rule
called RMEC (Rank Maximal Equal Contribution) that satisfies the
strongest notion of participation and is also ex post efficient. The rule
is polynomial-time computable and also satisfies many other desirable
fairness properties. The rule suggests a general approach to achieving ex
post efficiency and very strong participation.
1 Introduction
Making collective decisions is a fundamental issue in multi-agent systems. Two
fundamental goals in collective decision making are (1) agents should be incen-
tivized to participate and (2) the outcome should be such that there exists no
other outcome that each agent prefers. We consider these goals of participa-
tion [17, 23] and efficiency [24] in the context of probabilistic social choice.
In probabilistic social choice, we study probabilistic social choice functions
(PSCFs) which take as input agents’ preferences over alternatives and return
a lottery (probability distribution) over the alternatives.3 The lottery can also
represent time-sharing arrangements or relative importance of alternatives [2, 9].
For example, agents may vote on the proportion of time different genres of
songs are played on a radio channel. This type of preference aggregation is not
captured by traditional deterministic voting in which the output is a single
discrete alternative which may not be suitable to cater for different tastes.
When defining notions such as participation, efficiency, and strategyproof-
ness, one needs to reason about preferences over probability distributions (lot-
teries). In order to define these properties, we consider stochastic dominance
(SD). A lottery is preferred over another lottery with respect to SD , if for all
3 PSCFs are also referred to as social decision schemes in the literature.
utility functions consistent with the ordinal preferences, the former yields as
much utility as the latter.
Although efficiency and strategyproofness with respect to SD have been con-
sidered in a series of papers [2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 14, 19, 25], three notions of participation
with respect to SD were formalized only recently by Brandl et al. [10]. The three
notions include very strong (participating is strictly beneficial), strong (partici-
pating is at least as helpful as not participating) and standard (not participating
is not more beneficial). In contrast to deterministic social choice in which the
number of possible outcomes are at most the number of alternatives, proba-
bilistic social choice admits infinitely many outcomes which makes participation
even more meaningful: agents may be able to perturb the outcome of the lottery
slightly in their favour by participating in the voting process. In spirit of the
radio channel example, voters should ideally be able to increase the fractional
time of their favorite music genres by participating in the vote to decide the
durations.
Two central results presented by Brandl et al. [10] were: (1) there ex-
ists a PSCF (RSD—Random Serial Dictatorship) that satisfies very strong
SD-participation and ex post efficiency (Theorem 4, [10]); (2) There exists a
PSCF (uniform randomization over the Borda winners) that satisfies strong
SD-participation and SD-efficiency (Theorem 7, [10]). In this paper, we pro-
pose a new rule that like RSD satisfies very strong SD-participation and ex post
efficiency and has various desirable properties.
Serial dictator RSD SML BO ESR RMEC
Properties
SD-efficient + – + + + –
ex post efficient + + + + + +
Very strong SD-participation - + – – – +
Strong SD-participation + + – + – +
SD-participation + + + + + +
Anonymous – + + + + +
Proportional share – + – – – +
Strategyproof for dichotomous + + + – – +
and strict preferences
Polynomial-time computable + – + + + +
Table 1. A comparison of axiomatic properties of different PSCFs: RSD (ran-
dom serial dictatorship), SML (strict maximal lotteries), BO (uniform random-
ization over Borda winners), ESR (egalitarian simultaneous reservation) and
RMEC (Rank Maximal Equal Contribution).
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Contributions Our central contribution is a new probabilistic voting rule called
Rank Maximal Equal Contribution Rule (RMEC). RMEC satisfies very strong
SD-participation and ex post efficiency. Moreover RMEC is polynomial-time
computable and also satisfies other important axioms such as anonymity, neu-
trality, fair share, and proportional share. Fair share property requires that each
agent gets at least 1/n of the maximum possible utility. Proportional share is
a stronger version of fair share. Whereas RMEC is ex post efficient, it is not
SD-efficient.
On the other hand, RMEC has two key advantages over RSD the known rule
that satisfies very strong SD participation. Firstly, RMEC is polynomial-time
computable4 whereas computing the RSD probability shares is #P-complete.
The computational tractability of RMEC is a significant advantage over RSD
especially when PSCFs are used for time-sharing purposes where computing
the time shares is important. For RSD, it is even open whether there exists an
FPRAS (Fully Polynomial-time Approximation Scheme) for computing the out-
come shares/probabilities. Secondly, RMEC is much more efficient in a welfare
sense than RSD. In particular, RMEC dominates RSD in the following sense: for
any profile on which RMEC is not SD-efficient, RSD is not SD-efficient as well.5
In fact we show that for most preference profiles (for which arbitrary lotteries
can be SD-inefficient), RMEC almost always returns an SD-efficient outcome.
In fact, for 4 or less agents and 4 or less alternatives, all RMEC outcomes are
SD-efficient whereas this is not the case for RSD.
Our formulation of RMEC suggests a general computationally-efficient ap-
proach to achieving ex post efficiency and very strong SD-participation. We
identify MEC (Maximal Equal Contribution)—a general class of rules that all
satisfy the properties satisfied by RMEC: single-valued, anonymity, neutrality,
fair share, proportional share, ex post efficiency, very strong SD-participation,
and a natural monotonicity property. They are also strategyproof under strict
and dichotomous preferences.
A relative comparison of different probabilistic voting rules is summarized in
Table 1.
2 Related Work
One of the first formal works on probabilistic social choice is by Gibbard [19].
The literature in probabilistic social choice has grown over the years although
it is much less developed in comparison to deterministic social choice [13]. The
4 Unlike other desirable rules such as maximal lotteries [5, 12] and ESR [3], RMEC
is relatively simple and does not require any linear programs to find the outcome
lottery.
5 This idea of comparing two mechanisms with respect to a property may be of in-
dependent interest. When two mechanisms f and g do not satisfy a property φ in
general, one can still say that that f dominates g with respect to φ if for any instance
on which f does not satisfy φ, g does not satisfy it either. We prove that RMEC
dominates RSD wrt SD-efficiency.
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main result of Gibbard [19] was that random dictatorship in which each agent
has uniform probability of choosing his most preferred alternative is the unique
anonymous, strategyproof and ex post efficient PSCF. Random serial dictator-
ship (RSD) is the natural generalization of random dictatorship for weak pref-
erences but the RSD lottery is #P-complete to compute [4]. RSD is defined
by taking a permutation of the agents uniformly at random and then invoking
serial dictatorship: each agent refines the working set of alternatives by picking
his most preferred of the alternatives selected by the previous agents).
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8] initiated the use of stochastic dominance to
consider various notions of strategyproofness, efficiency, and fairness conditions
in the domain of random assignments which is a special type of social choice
setting. They proposed the probabilistic serial mechanism — a desirable ran-
dom assignment mechanism. Cho [14] extended the approach of Bogomolnaia
and Moulin [8] by considering other lottery extensions such as ones based on
lexicographic preferences.
Participation has been studied in the context of deterministic voting rules in
great detail. Fishburn and Brams [17] formalized the paradox of a voter having
an incentive to not participate for certain voting rules. Moulin [23] proved that
Condorcet consistent voting rules are susceptible to a “no show.” We point out
that no deterministic voting rule can satisfy very strong participation. Consider
a voting setting with two agents and two alternatives a and b. Agent 1 prefers a
over b and agent 2 prefers b over a. Then whatever the outcome of voting rule,
one agent will get a least preferred outcome despite participating. The example
further motivates the study of PSCFs with good participation incentives.
The tradeoff of efficiency and strategyproofness for PSCFs was formally con-
sidered in a series of papers [2, 3, 5, 6, 9]. Aziz and Stursberg [3] presented a
generalization — Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation (ESR) — of the prob-
abilistic serial mechanism to the domain of social choice. Aziz [2] proposed the
maximal recursive (MR) PSCF which is similar to the random serial dictatorship
but for which the lottery can be computed in polynomial time.
Brandl et al. [11] study the connection between welfare maximization and
participation and show how welfare maximization achieves SD-participation.
However the approach does not necessarily achieve very strong SD-participation
or even strong SD-participation.
In very recent work, Gross et al. [20] presented an elegant rule called 2-Agree
that satisfies very strong SD-participation, ex post efficiency, and various other
properties. However, the rule is defined for strict preferences.6
3 Preliminaries
Consider the social choice setting in which there is a set of agentsN = {1, . . . , n},
a set of alternatives A = {a1, . . . , am} and a preference profile %= (%1, . . . ,%n)
such that each %i is a complete and transitive relation over A. Let R denote
6 Under strict preferences, random dictatorship satisfies all the properties examined
in this paper.
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the set of all possible weak orders over A and let RN denote all the possible
preference profiles for agents in N . Let F (N) denote the set of all finite and non-
empty subsets of N. We write a %i b to denote that agent i values alternative a
at least as much as alternative b and use ≻i for the strict part of %i, i.e., a ≻i b
iff a %i b but not b %i a. Finally, ∼i denotes i’s indifference relation, i.e., a∼i b
if and only if both a %i b and b %i a. The relation %i results in equivalence
classes E1i , E
2
i , . . . , E
ki
i for some ki such that a ≻i a
′ if and only if a ∈ Eli and
a′ ∈ El
′
i for some l < l
′. Often, we will use these equivalence classes to represent
the preference relation of an agent as a preference list i : E1i , E
2
i , . . . , E
ki
i . For
example, we will denote the preferences a∼i b ≻i c by the list i : {a, b}, {c}. For
any set of alternatives A′, we will refer by max%i(A
′) to the set of most preferred
alternatives according to preference %i.
An agent i’s preferences are dichotomous if and only if he partitions the alter-
natives into at most two equivalence classes, i.e., ki ≤ 2. An agent i’s preferences
are strict if and only if %i is antisymmetric, i.e. all equivalence classes have size
1.
Let ∆(A) denote the set of all lotteries (or probability distributions) over
A. The support of a lottery p ∈ ∆(A), denoted by supp(p), is the set of all
alternatives to which p assigns a positive probability, i.e., supp(p) = {x ∈ A |
p(x) > 0}. We will write p(a) for the probability of alternative a and we will
represent a lottery as p1a1 + · · · + pmam where pj = p(aj) for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
For A′ ⊆ A, we will (slightly abusing notation) denote
∑
a∈A′ p(a) by p(A
′).
A PSCF is a function f : Rn → ∆(A). If f yields a set rather than a single
lottery, we call f a correspondence. Two minimal fairness conditions for PSCFs
are anonymity and neutrality. Informally, they require that the PSCF should
not depend on the names of the agents or alternatives respectively.
In order to reason about the outcomes of PSCFs, we need to determine
how agents compare lotteries. A lottery extension extends preferences over al-
ternatives to (possibly incomplete) preferences over lotteries. Given %i over A,
a lottery extension extends %i to preferences over the set of lotteries ∆(A).
We now define stochastic dominance (SD) which is the most established lottery
extension.
Under stochastic dominance (SD), an agent prefers a lottery that, for each
alternative x ∈ A, has a higher probability of selecting an alternative that is at
least as good as x. Formally, p %SDi q if and only if
∀y ∈ A :
∑
x∈A:x%iy
p(x) ≥
∑
x∈A:x%iy
q(x).
SD [8] is particularly important because p %SD q if and only if p yields at least
as much expected utility as q for any von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
consistent with the ordinal preferences [14].
Efficiency A lottery p is SD-efficient if and only if there exists no lottery q
such that q %SDi p for all i ∈ N and q ≻
SD
i p for some i ∈ N . A PSCF is
SD-efficient if and only if it always returns an SD-efficient lottery. A standard
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efficiency notion that cannot be phrased in terms of lottery extensions is ex post
efficiency. A lottery is ex post efficient if and only if it is a lottery over Pareto
efficient alternatives.
Participation Brandl et al. [10] formalized three notions of participation.
Formally, a PSCF f satisfies SD-participation if there exists no %∈ RN for
some N ∈ F (N) and i ∈ N such that f(%−i) ≻
SD
i f(%).
A PSCF f satisfies strong SD-participation if f(%) %SDi f(%−i) for all N ∈
F (N), %∈ RN , and i ∈ N .
A PSCF f satisfies very strong SD-participation if for allN ∈ F (N), %∈ RN ,
and i ∈ N , f(%) %SDi f(%−i) and
f(%) ≻SDi f(%−i) whenever ∃p ∈ ∆(A) : p ≻
SD
i f(%−i).
Very strong SD-participation is a desirable property because it gives an agent
strictly more expected utility for each utility function consistent with his ordinal
preferences. We already pointed out that no deterministic voting rule can satisfy
very strong SD-participation.
Strategyproofness A PSCF f is SD-manipulable if and only if there exists an
agent i ∈ N and preference profiles % and %′ with %j=%
′
j for all j 6= i such
that f(%′) ≻SDi f(%). A PSCF is weakly SD -strategyproof if and only if it is not
SD-manipulable. It is SD-strategyproof if and only if f(%) %SDi f(%
′) for all %
and %′ with %j=%
′
j for all j 6= i. Note that SD-strategyproofness is equivalent
to strategyproofness in the Gibbard sense.
4 Rank Maximal Equal Contribution
We present Rank Maximal Equal Contribution (RMEC). The rule is based on
the notion of rank maximality that is well-established in other contexts such as
assignment [22, 16].
For any alternative a, its corresponding rank vector is r(a) =
(r1(a), . . . , rm(a)) where rj(a) is the number of agents who have a as his j-
th most preferred alternative. For a lottery p, its corresponding rank vector
is r(p) = (r1(p), . . . , rm(p)) where rj(p) is
∑
i∈N
∑
a∈Ej
i
p(a). We compare
rank vectors lexicographically. One rank vector r = (r1, . . . , rm) is better than
r′ = (r′1, . . . , r
′
m) if for the smallest i such that ri 6= r
′
i, it must hold that ri > r
′
i.
The notion of rank vectors leads to a natural PSCF: randomize over alterna-
tives that have the best rank vectors. However such an approach does not even
satisfy strong SD-participation. It can also lead to perverse outcomes in which
minority is not represented at all: Consider the following preference profile.
1 : a, b 2 : a, b 3 : b, a
For the profile, the rank maximal rule simply selects a with probability 1. This
is unfair to agent 3 who is in a minority. Agent 3 does not get any benefit of
participating.
6
Let F (i, A,%) be the set of most preferred alternatives of agent i that have
best rank vector among all his most preferred alternatives. In the RMEC rule,
each agent i ∈ N contributes 1/n probability weight to a subset of his most
preferred alternatives. Precisely, he gives probability weight 1/n|F (i,A,%)| to each
alternative in F (i, A,%). The resultant lottery p is the RMEC outcome. We
formalize the RMEC rule as Algorithm 1. We view RMEC outcome lottery p as
consisting of n components p1, . . . , pn where
pi =
∑
a∈F (i,A,%)
1
n|F (i, A,%)|
a.
Algorithm 1 The Rank Maximal Equal Contribution rule
Require: (N,A,%)
Ensure: lottery p over A.
1: Initialize probability p(a) of each alternative a ∈ A to zero.
2: for i = 1 to |N | do
3: Identify F (i, A,%) the subset of alternatives in max%i(A) with the best rank
vector.
4: for each a ∈ F (i, A,%) do
5: p(a)←− p(a) + 1/(n|F (i,A,%)|)
6: end for{we will denote by pi the probability weight of
1/n allocated by agent i uniformly to alternatives
in F (i, A,%)}
7: end for
8: return lottery p.
Example 1. Consider the following preference profile.
1 : {a, b, c, f}, d, e 2 : {b, d}, e, {a, c, f}
3 : {a, e, f}, d, b, c 4 : c, d, e, {a, f}, b
5 : {c, d}, {e, a, b, f}
The rank vectors of the alternatives are as follows: a : (2, 1, 1, 1, 0);
b : (2, 1, 1, 0, 1); c : (3, 0, 1, 1, 0); d : (2, 3, 0, 0, 0); e : (1, 2, 2, 0, 0); and f :
(2, 1, 1, 1, 0).
Each agent selects the most preferred alternatives with the best rank vector
to give his 1/5 probability uniformly to the following alternatives: 1 : c; 2 : d;
3 : a, f ; 4 : c; and 5 : c.
So the outcome is 110a+
3
5c+
1
5d+
1
10f.
5 Properties of RMEC
We observe that RMEC is both anonymous and neutral. The RMEC outcome
can be computed in time polynomial in the input size. Since the contribution to
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an alternative by an agent is 1/yn for some y ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the probabilities are
rational.
Proposition 1. RMEC is anonymous and neutral. The RMEC outcome can be
computed in polynomial time O(m2n) and consists of rational probabilities.
Next we note that if preferences are strict, then RMEC is equivalent to
random dictatorship. As a corollary, RMEC satisfies both SD -efficiency and
very strong SD -participation under strict preferences. More interestingly, RMEC
satisfies very strong SD-participation even for weak orders.
Proposition 2. RMEC satisfies very strong SD-participation.
Proof. Let us consider the RMEC outcome p when i abstains and compare it
with the RMEC outcome q when i votes.
When i abstains, agent j ∈ N \ {i} contributes probability weight 1/(n− 1)
uniformly to alternatives in F (j, A,%−i). Now consider the situation when i
also votes. We want to identify the alternatives j will contribute to. Our central
claim is that for each a ∈ F (j, A,%) and b ∈ max%i(F (j, A,%−i)), it is the case
that a %i b. To prove the claim, assume for contradiction that when i votes, j
contributes to some alternative b less preferred by i to a ∈ max%i(F (j, A,%−i).
But this is not possible because b had at most the same rank as a when i did
not vote but since a ≻i b, a will have strictly more rank than b when i votes.
Hence when i votes, agent j sends all his probability weight to either alternatives
in max%i(F (j, A,%−i)) or alternatives even more preferred by i. Thus we have
proved the claim. By proving the claim, we have shown that when i participates,
any change in the relative contribution of some agent j 6= i is in favour of agent
i.
Take any b ∈ A and consider {a :a %i b}. Assume j is any agent in N \{i}. If
j contributes anything (at most 1/(n− 1)) to {a :a %i b} when agent i abstains,
then when i votes, j will contribute 1/n to {a : a %i b} because of the central
claim proved above. Now, for the two scenarios where i votes or abstains, the
contribution difference from j to {a :a %i b} is at most 1/n(n− 1), and the total
contribution difference from N \ {i} to {a : a %i b} is at most 1/n, which would
be compensated by the contribution of i to {a : a %i b} when i votes. Therefore
for each b ∈ A, q({a :a %i b}) ≥ p({a :a %i b}). Thus q %
SD
i p so RMEC satisfies
strong SD -participation.
We now show that RMEC satisfies very strong SD-participation. Suppose
that p = RMEC(N,A,%−i) is such that p(max%i(A)) < 1. It is sufficient to
show that for q = RMEC(N,A,%), q(max%i(A)) > p(max%i(A)). If some other
agent j’s relative contribution changes in favour of agent i, we are already done.
So let us assume that each j 6= i, F (j, A,%−i) = F (j, A,%). When i votes, the
total contribution to max%i(A) by agents other than i is p(max%i(A))
n−1
n
. The
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contribution of agent i to max%i(A) is
1
n
. Hence
q(max
%i
(A)) =
n− 1
n
p(max
%i
(A)) +
1
n
(1)
=
n− 1
n
p(max
%i
(A)) +
1
n
(p(max
%i
(A)) + 1− p(max
%i
(A)))
= p(max
%i
(A)) +
1
n
(1− p(max
%i
(A))) > p(max
%i
(A))
The last inequality holds because we supposed that p(max%i(A)) < 1 so that
1− p(max%i(A)) > 0. Thus RMEC satisfies very strong SD-participation. ⊓⊔
The fact that RMEC satisfies very strong SD-participation is one the central
results of the paper. We note here that very strong SD-participation can be a
tricky property to satisfy. For example the following simple variants of RMEC
violate even strong SD-participation: (1) each agent contributes to a most pre-
ferred Pareto optimal alternative or (2) each agent contributes uniformly to
Pareto optimal alternatives most preferred by her.
Example 2. Consider the following profile.
1 : a, e, d, f, b, c 2 : {b, c, d, f}, a, e
3 : e, a, {b, c, d, f} 4 : e, c, {f, b}, a, d
5 : e, {f, b}, c, a, d
Suppose we break-ties lexicographically and use rule (1). When 1 does not
vote then 2 selects b and the lottery is 1/4b+3/4eWhen 1 votes, 2 selects c because
b is now not Pareto optimal (f dominates b). The new lottery 1/5a+ 1/5c+ 3/5e is
not even weakly SD -better for 1 than 1/4b+3/4e. The same example works if each
agent randomizes uniformly over most preferred Pareto optimal alternatives.
Next, we prove that RMEC is also ex post efficient i.e., randomizes over
Pareto optimal alternatives.
Proposition 3. RMEC is ex post efficient.
Proof. Each alternative a in the support is an alternative that is the most pre-
ferred alternative of an agent i with the best rank vector. Suppose the alternative
a is not Pareto optimal. Then there exists another alternative b such that b %j a
for all j ∈ N and b ≻j a for some j ∈ N . Note that since a is the most preferred
alternative of i, it follows that b ∼i a. Since b Pareto dominates a, b is a most
preferred alternative of i with a better rank vector than a. But this contradicts
the fact that a is a most preferred alternative of i with the best rank vector. ⊓⊔
Although RMEC is ex post efficient, it unfortunately does not satisfy the
stronger efficiency property of SD-efficiency.
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Example 3. Consider the following preference profile with dichotomous prefer-
ences.
1, 2, 3, 4 : d 5, 6 : {d, c} 7, 8 : {d, b}
9 : {a, b} 10 : {a, c}
The RMEC outcome is 810d+
1
10c+
1
10b but is SD-dominated by
9
10d+
1
10a.
In the example above, although each agent chooses those most preferred alter-
natives that are most beneficial to other agents, the agents do not coordinate to
make these mutually beneficial decisions. This results in a lack of SD-efficiency.
Although RMEC is not SD-efficient just like RSD, it has a distinct advantage
over RSD in terms of SD-efficiency.
Proposition 4. For any profile, if the RSD outcome is SD-efficient, then the
RMEC outcome is also SD-efficient. Furthermore, there exist instances for which
the RSD outcome is not SD-efficient but the RMEC is not only SD-efficient but
SD-dominates the RSD outcome.
Proof. Due to the result of Aziz et al. [7] that SD-efficiency depends on the sup-
port, it is sufficient to show that supp(RSD(N,A,%)) ⊇ supp(RMEC(N,A,%)).
Now suppose that a ∈ supp(RMEC(N,A,%)). We also know that a ∈
F (i, A,%) for some i ∈ N . We prove that a ∈ supp(RSD(N,A,%)) by show-
ing that there exists one permutation pi under which serial dictatorship gives
positive probability to a. The first agent in the permutation pi is i.
We build the permutation pi so that a is an outcome of serial dictatorship
with respect to pi. The working set W is initialized to A. Agent i refines W
to max%i(A). Now suppose for contradiction that each remaining agent strictly
prefers some other alternative in W to a. In that case, a is not the rank maximal
alternative from max%i(A) which is a contradiction to a ∈ F (i, A,%). Thus for
some agent j not considered yet, a is a most preferred alternative in W . We can
add such an agent to the permutation and let him refine and update W . In W , a
still remains rank maximal (with respect to agents who have not been added to
the permutation) among alternatives in W . We can continue identifying a new
agent who maximally prefers a in the latest version of W and appending the
agent to the permutation pi until pi is fully specified. Note that a still remains
in the working set which implies that a ∈ supp(RSD(N,A,%)). This completes
the proof that if the RSD outcome is SD-efficient, then the RMEC outcome is
also SD-efficient.
Next we prove the second statement. Consider the following preference pro-
file.
1 : {a, c}, b, d 2 : {a, d}, b, c
3 : {b, c}, a, d 4 : {b, d}, a, c
The unique RSD lottery is p = 1/3 a+ 1/3 b+ 1/6 c+ 1/6d, which is SD-dominated
by 1/2 a+ 1/2 b. This was observed by Aziz et al. [5].
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We now compute the RMEC outcome. The rank vectors are as follows: a :
(2, 2, 0, 0); b : (2, 2, 0, 0); c : (2, 0, 2, 0); and d : (2, 0, 2, 0). The agents choose
alternatives as follows: 1 : a, 2 : a, 3 : b, 4 : b
RMEC returns the following lottery which is SD-efficient and SD-dominates
the RSD lottery: 1/2 a+ 1/2 b. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Although RMEC is not SD-efficient in general, we give experimental evidence
that it returns SD-efficient outcomes for most profiles. An exhaustive experiment
shows that RMEC is SD -efficient for every profile with 4 agents and 4 alterna-
tives. This is already in constrast to RSD that can return SD-inefficient outcome
for n = m = 4. Further experiments show that RMEC is SD-efficient for almost
all the profiles with a larger size. In the experiment, we generated profiles uni-
formly at random for specified numbers of agents and alternatives and examined
whether the corresponding RMEC lottery is SD-efficient. The results are shown
in Table 2.
|A|
|N |
4 5 6 7 8
4 10,000 10,000 10,000 9,999 10,000
5 9,999 10,000 10,000 9,998 9,999
6 9,999 10,000 9,996 10,000 9,999
7 10,000 9,999 9,997 9,998 9,999
8 9,999 9,996 9,998 9,997 9,996
Table 2. The number of profiles for which the RMEC outcome is SD-efficient
out of 10,000 uniformly randomly generated profiles for specified numbers of
agents and alternatives.
Note that in general for any given preference profile with some ties, a sig-
nificant proportion of lotteries are not SD-efficient. On the other hand, RMEC
almost always returns an SD-efficient lottery.
We say that a lottery satisfies fair welfare share if each agent gets at least
1/n of the maximum possible expected utility he can get from any outcome.
Fair welfare share was originally defined by Bogomolnaia et al. [9] for dichoto-
mous preferences. We observe that since RMEC gives at least 1/n probabil-
ity to each agent’s first equivalence class, it follows that each RMEC outcome
satisfies fair welfare share. Under dichotomous preferences, a compelling prop-
erty is that of proportional share [15]. We define it more generally for weak
orders as follows. A lottery p satisfies proportional share if for any set S ⊆ N ,∑
a∈A:∃i∈Ss.t. a∈max%i (A)
p(a) ≥ |S|/n. We note that proportional share implies
fair share.7 It is easy to establish that RMEC satisfies proportional share.
7 ESR does not satisfy proportional share and the maximal lottery rule does not satisfy
fair welfare share.
11
Proposition 5. RMEC satisfies the proportional share property and hence the
fair share property.
A different fairness requirement is that each agent finds the outcome at least
as preferred with respect to SD as the uniform lottery. A PSCF f satisfies SD-
uniformity if for each profile %, f(%) %SDi
1
m
a1 + · · · +
1
m
am for each i ∈ N .
RMEC does not satisfy SD-uniformity. However, we show that SD -uniformity
is incompatible with very strong SD-participation.
Proposition 6. There exists no PSCF that satisfies very strong SD-
participation and SD-uniformity.
Proof. Consider the following preference profile.
1 : a, b, c 2 : c, b, a 3 : a, b, c
When 1 and 2 vote, SD-uniformity demands, that the outcome is uniform.
When 1, 2, 3 vote, SD-uniformity still demands that the outcome is uniform.
However very strong-SD-participation demands that 3 should get strictly better
outcome with respect to SD . ⊓⊔
Whereas RMEC satisfies the strongest notion of participation, it is vulnerable
to strategic misreports.
Example 4. Consider the following preference profile.
1 : a, b, c, d, e 2 : e, d, c, b, a 3 : {d, c}, {a, b, e}
The outcome is 1/3a + 1/3d + 1/3e. Now assume that agent 1 reports, %′1:
a, c, b, e. Then the outcome is 1/3a+1/3c+1/3e which is better than 1/3a+1/3d+1/3e
with respect to SD for agent 1.
On the other hand, if n ≤ 2, we can prove that RMEC satisfies SD-
strategyproofness. Also if preferences are strict or if they are dichotomous,
RMEC is SD-strategyproof. We note that RMEC is also SD -strategyproof if
preferences are dichotomous or if they are strict.
We also note that RMEC satisfies a natural monotonicity property: reinforc-
ing an alternative in the agent’s preferences can only increase its probability.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we continued the line of research concerning strategic aspects in
probabilistic social choice (see e.g., [2, 6, 5, 10, 19, 25]). We proposed the RMEC
rule that satisfies very strong SD-participation and ex post efficiency as well as
various other desirable properties. In view of its various properties, it is a useful
PSCF with a couple of advantages over RSD. Unlike maximal lotteries [13] and
ESR [3], RMEC is relatively simple and does not require linear programming to
find the outcome lottery. The use of rank maximality also makes it easier to deal
with weak orders in a principled manner.
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A general approach Consider a scoring vector s = (s1, . . . , sm) such that s1 >
· · · > sm. An alternative in the j-th most preferred equivalence class of an agent
is given score sj . An alternative with the highest score is the one that receives
the maximum total score from the agents (see for e.g., [18] for discussion on
positional scoring vectors). Note that an alternative is rank maximal if it achieves
the maximum total score for a suitable scoring vector (nm, nm−1, . . . , 1). We also
note that RMEC is defined in a way so that each agent gives 1/n probability
to his most preferred alternatives that have the best rank vector. The same
approach can also be used to select the most preferred alternatives that have
the best Borda score or score with respect to any decreasing positional scoring
vector. We refer to s-MEC as the maximal equal contribution rule with respect
to scoring vector s. In the rule, each agent identifies F (i, A,%) the subset of
alternatives in max%i(A) with the best total score and uniformly distributes 1/n
among alternatives in F (i, A,%). The argument for very strong SD-participation
and ex post efficiency still works for any s-MEC rule. Any s-MEC rule is also
anonymous, neutral, single-valued, and proportional share fair.
It will be interesting to see how RMEC fares on more structured prefer-
ences [1]. Random assignment rules [8, 21] can be seen as applying a PSCF to
a voting problem with more structured preferences (see e.g., [3]). It will be in-
teresting to see how RMEC will fare as a random assignment rule especially in
terms of SD-efficiency.
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